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Abstract
We analyze a model of conformity with contrasting inferences. Given a form of ‘strong inferences’,
any non-conforming agent is believed to have ‘extreme preferences’ and can expect to receive low
esteem. With a weaker form of inferences, a non-conforming gent could be inferred to have ‘average
preferences’ and can expect a smaller fall in esteem. We find that the type of inferences need not
influence whether a conformist equilibrium exists. It will, however, impact on the size of the set of
conformist equilibria and thus weakening inferences acts as an equilibrium selection device.
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1 Introduction
A social norm is a prescription of how a person should behave. Examples, include ‘wear a suit at
work’, ‘do not live oﬀ other people’ or ‘send a Christmas card to someone who sends one to you’ (Elster
1989). Typically conformity to a norm involves sacrifice such as wearing a suit when jeans and a T-
shirt would be preferred, so why do people adhere to norms? One reason is that actions send signals
to others of a ‘persons type’ (Bernheim 1994). If non-conformity is seen as a signal of someone with
‘extreme preferences’, then conforming may be better than non-conforming because conformity, while
immediately costly, leads to better treatment by others (Kreps 1997). There can exist, therefore, a
‘conformist’ Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which people conform to the norm and anyone who does not
conform is inferred as having some ‘extreme preferences’. The problem for anyone wishing to model
this type of conformity is that the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not tie down ‘out of
equilibrium beliefs’ (Banks and Sobel 1987, Cho and Kreps 1987). Basically, because no person should
not conform, Nash equilibrium allows that anything could be inferred about a person who does not
conform. Clearly, however, out of equilibrium beliefs are a crucial aspect of the equilibrium. Our goal
in this paper, using the model of conformity developed by Bernheim, is to explore how out of equilibrium
beliefs impact conformity.
To explain the issues consider, informally, the norm of ‘how much to tip at a restaurant’. Suppose
that the size of tip is seen as a signal of generosity. The ‘ideal type of person’ is someone who would
like to tip 10%. People who would want to tip less are considered greedy, and people who would want
to tip more are too generous. Suppose that there exists a norm to tip 15% and people adhere to this
norm. If someone tips 10%, then what should others infer about this person? Even if we restrict
attention to so-called ‘reasonable beliefs’ (Banks and Sobel 1987, Cho and Kreps 1987), there are plenty
of possibilities. One possibility, let’s call it strong inferences, is to say that anyone who tips less than
15% must be very greedy; the fact that he has not adhered to the norm is a signal that he has the ‘most
extreme preferences’ (Bernheim). Another possibility, weak inferences, is to say that if someone tips
10%, then they may be very greedy, but equally they might just be the type of person who likes to tip
10%.
Intuitively, it should make a diﬀerence whether people have strong or weak inferences. If people
have strong inferences, then there are strong incentives to conform because the costs of deviation are
high. If people have weak inferences, then the motivations to conform are much less. Indeed a person
may deviate from the norm precisely to signal that they have the ‘ideal type’. To question whether
it does make a diﬀerence whether inferences are weak or strong we first need to formally capture the
notion of weak and strong inferences. We use the D1 Criterion, as used by Bernheim, to capture strong
inferences. Informally, if inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion then any deviation from the norm is inferred
to have been done by the person with the most incentive to deviate. To capture weak inferences, we
introduce the IWD1 Criterion, which is closely related to divinity (as defined by Banks and Sobel). If
inferences satisfy the IWD1 Criterion then any person with an incentive to deviate is inferred to be
equally likely to deviate from the norm. Using the model of conformity introduced by Bernheim, and
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contrasting the outcome when inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion to that when inferences satisfy the
IWD1 Criterion, we show whether it does make a diﬀerence if inferences are strong or weak. Our results
can be summarized as follows:
Equilibrium existence: Bernheim demonstrated that there always exists a conformist equilibrium (in
his model) if inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion. In this paper we provide a necessary and suﬃcient
condition, called the worse than condition, for the existence of a conformist equilibrium that can be
supported by inferences satisfying IWD1. We demonstrate, with an example, that the worse than
condition need not hold, so there need not exist a conformist equilibrium when inferences satisfy IWD1.
This demonstrates that using the D1 Criterion, as Bernheim did, is not innocuous. We prefer, however,
to focus on the more positive conclusion that in many cases a conformist equilibrium can be sustained
by weaker inferences than those of the D1 Criterion. The worse than condition will, for example, be
satisfied if the desire to be inferred as a ‘good type’ is suﬃciently high or many people have types near
the ideal. Bernheim’s existence result was a seminal contribution to the literature in showing how ‘harsh
enough penalties’ for non-conformity can be produced endogenously rather than simply assumed. Our
results demonstrate that weaker inferences can still produce ‘harsh’ penalties to non-conformity.
Equilibrium selection: One possible shortcoming of the results of Bernheim is the multiplicity of
conformist equilibria. In particular, there may exist multiple conformist equilibria supported by inferences
satisfying the D1 Criterion, all based on a diﬀerent norm. For example, there could be a conformist
equilibrium where the norm is to ‘tip 5%’, one where the norm is to ‘tip 20%’, and so on. If there are
many equilibria, each with a diﬀerent norm, then one may question how we can think of conformity
arising if no-one knows what the norm is, and everybody knows that no one knows what the norm
is, and so on? Bernheim suggests, as seems reasonable, that this indeterminacy may be resolved by a
focal point, possibly determined by history or a policy maker. We demonstrate, however, that weaker
inferences act as an equilibrium selection device and reduce the set of actions that could potentially
become norms. Indeed, there may be at most one conformist equilibrium, and therefore at most one
norm, that can be supported by any inferences satisfying IWD1.1 This norm will correspond to the
preference of what we call the median type. The median type is characterized by a symmetry in which
the ‘costs’ of being seen as ‘above’ or ‘below’ this type are the same. For example, if the median type is
‘to tip 15%’, then it is the same to be seen as ‘someone who likes to tip more than 15%’ as to be seen
as ‘someone who likes to tip less than 15%’.
Equilibrium ‘eﬃciency’: There will always exist a conformist equilibrium supported by inferences
satisfying the D1 Criterion where the norm is the action preferred by the ‘ideal type’ (Bernheim).
Intuitively one might expect that the equilibrium selection of IWD1 selects such an equilibrium. In
general, however, the median type diﬀers from the ideal type, so there need not exist a conformist
equilibrium supported by inferences satisfying IWD1 where the norm is the action preferred by the ‘ideal
type’. For example, if ‘tip 10%’ is preferred by the ideal type but to ‘tip 15%’ is preferred by the median
1Related results are due to Azar (2004). Azar considers a model of tipping where slight deviations from a tipping norm
result in only mild consequences. This could be equated to weak inferences. Azar finds that a tipping norm can only be
sustained on specific tip values that will depend on the preferences of agents. There is therefore not the multiplicity of
equilibria that one finds in Bernheim.
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type, then there may exist a conformist equilibrium with a norm to ‘tip 15%’ but not one to ‘tip 10%’.
The median type will diﬀer from the ideal type if it is, say, better to be inferred as more generous rather
than more greedy than the ideal. In this case, a norm of 10% could not be an equilibrium because some
would want to tip more in order to signal that they are more generous than the ideal type.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 outlines the model, Section 3 discusses out of equilibrium beliefs,
Section 4 treats equilibrium existence, Section 5 equilibrium selection, Section 6 q-uniform inferences
and Section 7 concludes with an Appendix containing remaining proofs and full derivations of the
examples used.
2 Model of conformity
We use a model of conformity introduced by Bernheim. The model is characterized by a separability
between an agent’s intrinsic utility, determined by his own action, and esteem, determined by the type
others infer him to have. It is also characterized by incomplete information about type. An agent’s
action, thus, serves as a signal to others of his type. [For complete details of the model see Bernheim.]
There are a continuum of agents. Each agent chooses a publicly observable action x from the set
X = [0, 2] and has a type from the set of agent types T = [0, 2]. The type of an agent indicates his
intrinsic bliss point. Specifically, there exists an intrinsic utility function g : [0, 2]→ R and an agent of
type t receives intrinsic utility g(x− t) from playing action x where
Assumption 1: Function g is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, symmetric and
achieves a maximum at 0.
Thus, an agent of type t maximizes intrinsic utility by choosing action x = t, and the further his action
from type, then the lower his intrinsic utility.
The distribution of types within the population is described by a cumulative density function F
defined on set T and a corresponding probability density function f .
Assumption 2: The support [f ] = T and f is continuous.
The type of an agent is private information. Agents receive esteem according to the type that they are
inferred to be. Specifically, there exists an esteem function h : [0, 2]→ R where h(b) is the esteem of an
agent who is inferred to be of type b.
Assumption 3: Function h is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, symmetric (h(1+z) =
h(1− z)) and achieves a maximum at b = 1.
Type 1 is the ideal type in the sense that someone inferred to be of type 1 receives the maximum esteem.
The further is inferred type from 1, then the less is esteem; so someone inferred to be of type 0 or 2
receives the least esteem.
The tension that will exist in the model between conforming and not conforming should now be
clear. An agent faces the trade oﬀ between choosing an action that gives high intrinsic utility but may
4
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result in low esteem versus sacrificing intrinsic utility to earn esteem. The key feature is that each type
of agent has her own preferred action that maximizes intrinsic utility, but there exists a unique type
that agents wish to be inferred as.
Action will be used as a signal of type. Specifically, there exists an inference function φ(b, x) where,
informally, φ(b, x) denotes the probability that an agent who chooses x is inferred to be of type b. More
formally, φ(·, x) is a probability density function defined on set X. Let
Tφ(x) := {b ∈ T : φ(b, x) > 0}
be the set of types that are inferred as having potentially chosen x. Let
Hφ(x) :=
Z 2
0
φ(b, x)h(b)db (1)
denote the esteem of an agent who chooses x. Note that esteem is a weighted average based on the
esteem function and inferences.
The payoﬀ of an agent is a weighted sum of intrinsic utility and esteem. Specifically, the payoﬀ of
an agent of type t from playing action x given inference function φ is
U(x, t, φ) := g(x− t) + λHφ(x)
where λ is an index of how important is esteem for the agent.
2.1 Signalling equilibria
All agents of the same type are assumed to choose the same action.2 An action function µ maps T
into X where µ(t) denotes the action chosen by agents of type t. The pair (µ, φ) consisting of action
function µ and inference function φ are suﬃcient to determine the payoﬀs of all agents. Pair (µ, φ) is
a signalling equilibrium if actions are optimal given inferences and inferences can be deduced from the
action function using Bayes’ Rule. Following Bernheim we focus on a specific type of pure strategy
signalling:
A signalling equilibrium (µ, φ) is characterized by a tuple (xp, tl, th, µs) consisting of real numbers xp, tl
and th, where 0 ≤ tl ≤ xp ≤ th ≤ 2, and a continuous, strictly increasing function µs : [0, 1]→ X where3
µ(t) =



µs(t) if t < tl
xp if t ∈ [tl, th]
2− µs(2− t) if t > th
. (2)
2Essentially this is an assumption that agents use pure strategies. Allowing mixed strategies significantly complicates
the analysis and also makes the interpretation of an equilibrium much more diﬃcult. It need not, however, be an innocuous
assumption. In particular, when we look at equilibrium existence in Section 4 it should be born in mind that we are looking
for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
3Note that it is more convenient for us to use the function µs mapping types to actions. Bernheim uses function φs
mapping actions to types. Thus, µs(t) = φ
−1
s (t) and µ
−1
s (x) = φs(x).
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The inference function φ will satisfy
φ(b, x) =



1 if x = µ(b) and b < tl or b > th
0 if x = µ(b0) 6= xp for some b0 6= b
f(b) [F (th)− F (tl)]−1 if x = xp and b ∈ [tl, th]
0 if x = xp and b 6= [tl, th]
. (3)
Bernheim demonstrates that any (pure strategy) signalling equilibrium with inferences satisfying the
D1 Criterion (to be explained below) can be characterized by such a tuple (xp, tl, th, µs). Thus, an agent
with type t < tl chooses action µ(t) and is (correctly) inferred to be of type t, so receives esteem h(t).
An agent with type t > th chooses action µ(t) and is (correctly) inferred to be of type t, so receives
esteem h(t).4 Agents with types t ∈ [tl, th] choose action xp. Consequently, they receive esteem
Hφ(xp) :=
Z th
tl
h(b)f(b)
F (th)− F (tl)
db. (4)
Agents with types t /∈ [tl, th] fully separate while those with types t ∈ [tl, th] constitute a central pool
who choose unique action xp. Action xp can be interpreted as the norm, and agents with types t ∈ [tl, th]
conform to the norm. Note that xp need not equal 1, but a type 1 agent will conform to the norm, so
tl ≤ 1 ≤ th (see Theorem 3 of Bernheim). An inference function satisfying (3) is consistent with Bayes
Rule. It remains to check that actions are optimal. For this we require that
g(µ(t)− t) + λHφ(µ(t)) ≥ g(x− t) + λHφ(x) (5)
for all t ∈ T and x ∈ X.5
Throughout the following we shall use examples to illustrate the analysis. All examples will be based
on the spherical case of g(z) = −z2 and h(b) = (1 − b)2. Even though we have not quite finished the
description of a signalling equilibrium (we do this in the next Section), it seems worthwhile to provide
our first example of such an equilibrium in order to illustrate what one may look like. The example will
also prove useful in discussing the further issues that will arise as we proceed.
In Example 1 we set λ = 1.25 and f(t) = 0.5 for all t ∈ [0, 2]. There exists (see the Appendix
for more details on all of the examples) a signalling equilibrium (µ, φ) with inferences satisfying the D1
Criterion where xp = 1, tl ≈ 0.076 and th ≈ 1.924. The norm, therefore, is 1, and any agent with type
t ∈ [0.076, 1.924] conforms to the norm. Given (3) this means that φ(b, 1) = (th − tl)−1 for all b ∈ [tl, th]
and is 0 otherwise. Using (4) we can then calculate that an agent who conforms to the norm receives
esteem Hφ(1) = −0.2845. An agent with type t ∈ [0, 0.076) does not conform to the norm but, as we
can see in Figure 1 below, does choose an action closer to the norm than his type. An agent of type
4Note that the action function is symmetric in the sense that µ(2− t) = µ(t) if t < tl and 2− tl > th. This is the case
even if the distribution over types f is asymmetric (see p. 852 of Bernheim).
5 If (µ, φ) is a signalling equilibrium, then µ can be recovered from φ, and thus, where it will cause no confusion, we
shall use φ to characterize the equilibrium, as in the notation Hφ(t).
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t = 0.05, for example, chooses action µ(0.05) ≈ 0.4. The type 0.05 agent will, however, be correctly
inferred as a type 0.05 agent and thus receive esteem −(1− 0.05)2.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
type
ac
tio
n
Figure 1: The action function in Example 1 when xp = 1.
Three special cases of a conformist equilibrium are (1) a fully separating equilibrium where tl = th = 1
implying that there is no central pool, (2) a fully conformist equilibrium where tl = 0 and th = 2,
implying that all agents conform to the norm and conformity is no signal of type, (3) a partially
conformist equilibrium where either tl ∈ (0, 1) and/or th ∈ (1, 2). Example 1 is an example of a
partially conformist equilibrium. This lies somewhere between the two extremes of full separation and
full conformity where there is a central pool but not all types of agent conform to the norm.
3 Out of equilibrium beliefs and the IWD1
Given a signalling equilibrium (µ, φ) characterized by tuple (xp, tl, th, µs), let
xl := lim
t↑tl
µ(t) and xh := lim
t↓th
µ(t)
be the actions chosen by those ‘at the edge of the central pool’ (where we set xl = 0 or xh = 2 if
appropriate). Let
XEµ =
©
x ∈ X : µ−1(x) = ∅
ª
be the set of actions that should not be chosen if agents behave according to action function µ. From
Bernheim we know that XEµ = [xl, xh] − {xp}.6 If (µ, φ) is a fully separating equilibrium, then
XEµ = ∅. Otherwise, xl < xh and the set XEµ is non-empty (Theorem 6 of Bernheim). There are
therefore actions that should not be played in equilibrium. In Example 1, for instance, we find that
6That actions x ∈ [0, xl) and x ∈ (xh, 2] are chosen follows because µ(0) = 0 (if tl > 0), µ(2) = 2 (if th < 2), and the
action function is a continuous function of type for t ∈ [0, tl) and t ∈ (th, 2].
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xl ≈ 0.4512 and xh ≈ 1.5488, so XEµ = [0.4512, 1) ∪ (1, 1.5488]. No agent, for example, should choose
x = 0.9.
As is standard (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991), the definition of a signalling equilibrium ties down
(see in particular (3) and (4)), inferences about actions that are chosen with positive probability. It
does not, however, impose restrictions on inferences about actions ‘oﬀ the equilibrium path’, namely
x ∈ XEµ. Basically, if an agent ‘deviates’ and chooses an action x ∈ XEµ, then Bayes Rule is no guide
as to what type of agent it should be inferred has deviated.
Clearly inferences about actions oﬀ the equilibrium path are a crucial aspect of equilibrium as they
determine the incentives or lack of incentive for an agent not to conform to the norm. It determines,
for instance, in Example 1 whether a type 0.9 agent would want to conform to the norm and choose
xp = 1 or ‘deviate’ and choose his internal bliss point of x = 0.9. Thus, one looks to impose criterion
on the inference function φ to obtain ‘reasonable’ beliefs (Banks and Sobel 1997, Cho and Kreps 1997).
Bernheim uses the D1 criterion. We shall formally define the Criterion below but can state here
Fact 1: If (µ∗, φ∗) is a signalling equilibrium characterized by tuple (xp, tl, th, µs) and inferences satisfy
the D1 Criterion, then Tφ
∗
(x) = {tl} for all xl ≤ x < xp and Tφ∗(x) = {th} for all xh ≥ x > xp.
Thus, any agent who deviates from the central pool is assumed to have either of the types ‘at the edge of
the central pool’. This provides a strong incentive for an agent to conform. In Example 1, for instance
any agent who chooses x = 0.9 is inferred to have type tl = 0.0761, meaning that they receive esteem
Hφ
∗
(0.9) = −(1− 0.9)2 ≈ −0.854. Given that the esteem from conforming is Hφ∗(1) = −0.2845, there
is no incentive to deviate.
The D1 Criterion imposes a ‘strong’ criterion on out of equilibrium beliefs. Intuitively, for instance,
it seems reasonable that a type t = 0.9 agent would potentially deviate to x = 0.9 as this is his intrinsic
bliss point. This motivates asking whether a signalling equilibrium (µ∗, φ∗) supported by inferences
satisfying the D1 Criterion remains an equilibrium if ‘weaker’ conditions are assumed of the inference
function. To answer this question we clearly must define ‘weaker’ conditions. We do this below to give
inference function φ0. Given this we then fix µ∗ and ask whether the pair (µ∗, φ0) is also a conformist
equilibrium.
Before proceeding one point is worth noting. For each action x ∈ X, there is at most one signalling
equilibrium with inferences satisfying the D1 Criterion where the norm is xp = x (Theorem 4 of Bern-
heim). Thus, fix a norm xp and let (µ∗, φ∗) denote a signalling equilibrium with inferences satisfying the
D1 Criterion. It is a simple matter to show that any signalling equilibrium with inferences satisfying (3)
and where the norm is xp must also have action function µ∗, whether inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion
or not. Fact 2 (below) will formalize this for the inference functions that we shall use, so we do not
spend time formally proving this more general claim here.7 What this does mean, however, is that we
7However here is the intuition: In constructing the unique equilibrium action function µ∗ when inferences satisfy the D1
Criterion, the out of equilibrium beliefs are irrelevant (see pages 849-857 of Bernheim or the derivation of µ∗ for Example
1 in the current paper). The only point at which out or equilibrium beliefs prove important is in checking whether µ∗
actually is consistent with equilibrium or not (see page 857 of Bernheim). Diﬀerent out of equilibrium beliefs cannot
therefore lead to diﬀerent equilibrium actions, but they can change whether µ∗ is consistent with an equilibrium.
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can fix the action function µ∗ without any need to worry whether a weakening of inferences should lead
to a change in equilibrium actions.
3.1 Incentive to deviate
Take as given a signalling equilibrium (µ∗, φ∗) where inferences φ∗ satisfy the D1 Criterion. If we
consider some ‘weaker’ inferences φ0 then we know that pair (µ∗, φ0) can only be a signalling equilibrium if
inference functions φ∗ and φ0 ‘agree’ for actions x /∈ XEµ∗ . Thus, we shall impose that φ∗(b, x) = φ0(b, x)
for all b and x /∈ XEµ∗ . This implies that Hφ∗(x) = Hφ0(x) for all x /∈ XEµ∗ .8 It also implies
that equilibrium payoﬀs U(µ∗(t), t, φ∗) can be fixed independently of φ0. That is U(µ∗(t), t, φ∗) =
U(µ∗(t), t, φ0). What may change when we consider inferences φ0 are inferences about actions x ∈ XEµ∗
that are oﬀ the equilibrium path. Thus, Hφ
∗
(x) and Hφ
0
(x) may diﬀer as may U(x, t, φ∗) and U(x, t, φ0)
for x ∈ XEµ∗ . This can change the ‘incentives’ to conform.
Given pair (µ∗, φ0) if an agent of type t were to choose some action x ∈ XEµ∗ , then he would receive
payoﬀ g(x− t)+λHφ0(x). We know that g(x− t)+λHφ∗(x) is less than U(µ∗(t), t, φ∗), so he would not
want to deviate given inference function φ∗. But what about g(x−t)+λHφ0(x)? If g(x−t)+λHφ0(x) ≥
U(µ∗(t), t, φ∗) then he would want to deviate to x and not conform. If g(x−t)+λHφ0(x) ≤ U(µ∗(t), t, φ∗)
then he would not want to deviate. The first possibility is not consistent with equilibrium while the
second is. Crucial, therefore, is the value of9
εφ
∗
(t, x) :=
U(µ∗(t), t, φ∗)− g(x− t)
λ
. (6)
If Hφ
0
(x) < εφ
∗
(t, x), then an agent of type t would not gain from choosing x rather than µ∗(t). If
Hφ
0
(x) > εφ
∗
(t, x), then an agent of type t would do better choosing x than µ∗(t). Given this we shall
interpret εφ
∗
(t, x) as the incentive to conform and say that a type t agent has more incentive to deviate
to x than a type t0 agent if εφ
∗
(t, x) < εφ
∗
(t0, x).10 Clearly, if (µ∗, φ0) is a signalling equilibrium, then
Hφ
0
(x) ≤ εφ∗(t, x) for all t and x ∈ XEµ∗ . This is equivalent to condition (5) and will provide a simple
check of whether (µ∗, φ0) is a signalling equilibrium or not. Note that εφ
∗
(t, x) is independent of φ0 and
can thus be fixed given φ∗.
Figures 2a and b plot εφ
∗
(t, x) for values of x = 0.9 and 1.4 respectively. In interpretation we can
see from Figure 2a that εφ
∗
(0.5, 0.9) ≈ −0.35, implying that a type t = 0.5 agent would prefer x = 0.9
to µ∗(0.5) = 1 if the esteem from playing x = 0.9 exceeded −0.35. As we have already seen, if inferences
satisfy the D1 Criterion, then Hφ
∗
(0.9) = −0.854, so a type 0.5 agent does not want to deviate. We
need to question whether ‘weaker’ conditions on inferences still guarantee that Hφ
0
(0.9) < −0.35.
8This explains why we shall not be interested in fully separating equilibria where XEµ
∗
= ∅ and, thus, the D1 Criterion
is never used.
9Bernheim uses the notation I(x, t) where I(x, t) = λεφ(t, x).
10Note, however, that, fixing a value of Hφ(x) an agent will typically either do better to choose x or do better not to
choose x, so it is not immediately clear that a higher εφ(t, x) would equate with less likelihood of actually choosing x.
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Figure 2a: incentive to choose x = 0.9
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Figure 2b: incentive to choose x = 1.4
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Figure 2: The value of εφ
∗
(t, 0.9) and εφ
∗
(t, 1.4) in Example 1 when xp = 1.
We can see from Figure 2 that when x = 0.9 agents with types near tl have the most incentive to
deviate while the converse holds when x = 1.4. [Also note the change in the scale of the y-axis.] This
is a general property as shown by Bernheim (see the Proof of Theorem 3):
Lemma 1 (Bernheim): For any x ∈ (xl, xp) the value εφ
∗
(t, x) is strictly decreasing in t for t < tl and
strictly increasing in t for t > tl.11 For any x ∈ (xp, xh) the value εφ
∗
(t, x) is strictly decreasing in t for
t < th and strictly increasing in t for t > th.
The type of agent who has most incentive to deviate proves important, so let
εφ
∗
(x) =
½
t ∈ T : εφ∗(t, x) = min
b∈T
εφ
∗
(b, x)
¾
.
3.2 Weak D1 Criterion
Before defining weaker conditions on the inference function we can now formally define the D1 Criterion
(Cho and Kreps).
11More formally, if t0 < t00 ≤ tl then ε(t0, x) > ε(t00, x), and if tl ≤ t0 < t00, then ε(t00, x) > ε(t0, x).
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D1 Criterion: Inference function φ∗ satisfies the D1 Criterion if φ∗(b, x) = 0 for each x ∈ XEµ∗ and
every b /∈ εφ∗(x).
Fact 1 is immediate from Lemma 1. To contrast the D1 Criterion we shall follow the approach of
Cho and Kreps (1987) and Banks and Sobel (1987) by modelling inferences φ0 as resulting from an
iterative process of reasoning. More specifically, we shall consider a sequence of inference functions
φ0, φ1, ..., φy, ... where informally φ
0 = limy→∞ φy.
One condition we shall impose in constructing the inference functions φy is that those agents with
relatively more incentive to deviate to action x are, at least, equally likely to be inferred as having
chosen x.
Incentive Condition: Inference function φ satisfies the incentive condition if for each x ∈ XEµ∗ and any
t, t0 ∈ [tl, th] or t, t0 ∈ [0, tl] or t, t0 ∈ [th, 2], if εφ
∗
(t, x) ≤ εφ∗(t0, x), then
φy(t, x)
φy(t0, x)
≥ f(t)
f(t0)
. (7)
Clearly, an inference function satisfying the D1 Criterion satisfies the incentive condition. We shall
discuss other possibilities as we proceed.
To construct the inference functions φy we need one definition. Given some real number A let
T (x,A) := {t ∈ T : εφ∗(t, x) ≤ A} ∪ εφ∗(x). (8)
If t ∈ T (x,A), then an agent of type t would want to deviate to action x if the esteem Hφ(x) from
choosing x is greater than or equal to A. If no agent would wish to deviate, then we have T (x,A) =
εφ
∗
(x). The necessity for this condition will soon become clear.
The D1 Criterion essentially fixes A at h (tl) or h (th). Given that (µ∗, φ∗) is a signalling equilibrium
we know, for instance, that T (x, h(tl)) = εφ
∗
(x) for all x ∈ (xl, xp). To derive weaker inferences
we need to set A at some level greater than Hφ
∗
(x). In equilibrium, those who conform and receive
esteemHφ
∗
(xp) have the highest esteem.12 An intuitive starting point, therefore, in constructing weaker
inferences is to set Hφ
∗
(xp) as an upper bound on the esteem an agent could expect if he were to choose
action x ∈ XEµ∗ .13 If t /∈ T (x,Hφ∗(xp)), then a type t agent would not want to deviate to action x if
he expected to receive esteem Hφ
∗
(xp). This suggests a weaker condition on inferences.
12To demonstrate this we need to show that Hφ
∗
(xp) > h(tl), h(th). Given that tl < xl < xp a type tl agent would do
strictly better to choose action xl than xp if h(tl) ≥ Hφ
∗
(xp). This contradicts that (µ∗, φ∗) is a signalling equilibrium. A
similar argument shows that h(th) < Hφ
∗
(xp).
13A weaker starting point would be to set A equal to the maximum esteem of h(1). It turns out that doing so would not
significantly alter our results. In particular, as can be seen from reading the proofs, the results of Section 5 (equilibrium
selection) and the results of Section 4 (equilibrium existence) concerning the necessary conditions for equilibrium would be
unaﬀected. The suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium existence would change because any type of agent would likely want
to deviate to any x for an esteem of h(1). It, therefore, becomes harder to tie down inferences. This, however, only seems
to motivate why h(1) is unreasonably high as an intuitive starting point in constructing inferences.
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Weak D1 Criterion:14 Inference function φ0 satisfies the weak D1 criterion if it satisfies the incentive
condition and φ0(b, x) = 0 for every x ∈ XEµ
∗
and every b /∈ T (x,Hφ∗(xp)).
Inference function φ∗, satisfying the D1 Criterion, also satisfies the weak D1 Criterion. There are,
however, many other inference functions that do not satisfy the D1 Criterion, but do satisfy the weak
D1 Criterion. In Example 1 for instance we have that Hφ
∗
(1) = −0.2845, so, as can be seen from
Figure 2a, T (0.9,Hφ
∗
(1)) = [0, 0.95]. This implies that inference function φ0 in which all agents with
types t ∈ [0, 0.95] are inferred as equally likely to have chosen x = 0.9 satisfies the weak D1 Criterion.
This is what we shall define below as uniform inferences and implies that φ0(b, 0.9) = 1.053 for all
b ∈ [0, 0.95] and is 0 otherwise. [See Table 1 below.] With this inference function the esteem from
choosing x = 0.9 can be calculated, using (4), as Hφ0(0.9) = −0.3507. This can be contrasted with
the esteem of Hφ
∗
(0.9) = −0.854 that would result if inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion. The ‘weaker
inferences’ of the weak D1 Criterion result in a higher esteem from deviating and, in this case, are
not consistent with equilibrium. This can be seen from Figure 2a where −0.3507 > εφ∗(t, 0.9) for
many types, implying that there are agents with an incentive to deviate to 0.9. Consequently there are
inferences that satisfy the weak D1 Criterion but are not consistent with a signalling equilibrium (in
Example 1 with norm xp = 1).
The Weak D1 Criterion can, however, be thought of as the starting point (rather than the end point)
in forming inferences. In particular, there is an inconsistency between the esteem Hφ
∗
(xp) that agents
‘expect’ to receive and actual esteem Hφ0(x). If inferences are given by φ0, then one could reason that
the most esteem an agent can expect from choosing action x is Hφ0(x). For instance in Example 1 the
most esteem an agent could expect from choosing x = 0.9 is Hφ0(0.9) = −0.3507. This suggests that
it may be more appropriate to say that a type t agent is only deemed likely to choose x if he had an
incentive to do so given esteem of Hφ0(x) (rather than Hφ
∗
(xp)). This leads to
1-step weak D1 Criterion (1-WD1): Inference function φ1 satisfies the 1-step weak D1 criterion if it
satisfies the incentive condition and φ1(b, x) = 0 for every x ∈ XEµ
∗
and b /∈ T (x,Hφ0(x)) and φ0
satisfies the weak D1 criterion.
From Figure 2a we can see that when x = 0.9 and Hφ0(0.9) = −0.3507, we get that T (0.9,Hφ0(0.9)) =
[0, 0.5373]. We can thus revise the set of agent types who could be inferred as having deviated to x.
Given the 1-WD1 we can also revise the esteem an agent can expect to receive from choosing x to
Hφ1(x). Iterating this argument produces more refined beliefs where the more iterations are performed,
the more introspection is required of agents.
y-step weak D1 Criterion ( y-WD1): Inference function φy satisfies y-WD1 if it satisfies the incentive
condition and φy(b, x) = 0 for every x ∈ XEµ
∗
and b /∈ T (x,Hφy−1(x)) and φy−1 satisfies y − 1-WD1.
14This condition can be seen as in the spirit of equilibrium domination (Cho and Kreps). We adopt the term weak D1
criterion reflecting the discussion of Cho and Kreps about the D1 criterion.
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Iterated weak D1 Criterion (IWD1): Inference function φ0 satisfies IWD1 if φ0(b, x) = 0 for every
x ∈ XEµ∗ and b /∈ T (x,Hφ∞(x)) where H∞(x) := limy→∞{Hφy(x)}.15
In the y-step IWD1, starting with beliefs satisfying the weak D1 criterion, y iterations are performed
sequentially, eliminating types of agents deemed as potentially choosing each action. Taking y to infinity
we obtain beliefs satisfying IWD1.
At this stage we have not specified how φy will be derived from φy−1. If inferences satisfy the
D1 Criterion, then we set φ0(b, x) = 0 for all b /∈ εφ
∗
(x) and x ∈ XEµ∗ . Given that (µ∗, φ∗) is an
equilibrium, it is trivial that inferences φy satisfying the D1 Criterion also satisfy y-WD1. Consequently
the D1 Criterion is a special case of IWD1. A second special case, already discussed informally above,
represents the opposite extreme where all agents who had an incentive to deviate are deemed equally
likely to have chosen x.
Uniform y-step weak D1 Criterion (uniform y-WD1): Inference function φy satisfies uniform y-WD1 if
φy(b, x) =



0 for all b /∈ T (x,Hφy−1(x))
f(b)
hR
T (x,Hφy−1 (x)) f(b)db
i−1
otherwise
(9)
and φy−1 satisfies uniform y − 1-WD1.16
Thus, all agents with a positive incentive to deviate are seen as equally likely to deviate. Such inferences
are essentially equivalent to divine beliefs as introduced by Banks and Sobel. The D1 Criterion and
uniform IWD1 can be seen as opposite ends of the spectrum of inference functions consistent with IWD1
(and the incentive condition). In Section 6 we discuss a more general inference function that covers the
entire spectrum. In Example 1 with uniform inferences we get
Table 1: Deriving uniform inferences for Example 1.
x = 0.9 x = 1.4
y T (x,Hφy−1x)) Hφy(x) T (x,Hφy−1(t∗)) Hφy(x)
− −0.2845 −0.2845
0 [0, 0.95] −0.3507 [1.2, 2] −0.4136
1 [0, 0.54] −0.5590 [1.4017, 2] −0.5210
2 {tl} −0.854 [1.5698, 2] −0.6315
3 [1.7429, 2] −0.7649
4 {th} −0.854
Thus, pair (µ∗, φ0) is not a signalling equilibrium because agents of type [0, 0.95] would want to deviate
to action x = 0.9 and agents of type [1.2, 2] would want to deviate to action x = 1.4. The more iterations
we perform, however, the more types are eliminated as potentially having chosen both x = 0.9 and 1.4.
15 If the limy→∞{Hφy (x)} does not exist (see Example 3 in Section 5.1 below), set H∞(x) = miny
©
Hφy (x)
ª
.
16We use the natural extension of a uniform weak D1 Criterion to derive φ0.
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Inference function φ2 is such that no agent would want to deviate to x = 0.9 because the esteem from
doing so is only Hφ1(0.9) = −0.5590. In this case we set esteem at h(εφ∗(x)). The inference function
must satisfy φ2(b, 0.9) > 0 for some b, so once all types are eliminated (as was the case above), we have
to make an assumption. Setting Hφ
0
(x) = h(εφ
∗
(x)) seems natural but means that inferences in this
case are equivalent to those of the D1 Criterion (for this particular x).
More generally if (µ, φ0) is a signalling equilibrium and inferences satisfy y-WD1 then Tφ
0
y+1(x) is {tl}
or {th}. Otherwise, by construction, an agent of type t ∈ Ty+1(x) would do strictly better to choose
x than µ(t). Thus, a signalling equilibrium can be supported by inferences satisfying IWD1 only if
inferences ‘collapse’ to those obtained with the D1 criterion. This need not be the case as we shall show
below. It does, however, motivate an important observation:
Fact 2: If (µ, φ0) is a signalling equilibrium and inference function φ0 satisfies y-WD1 then there exists
a signalling equilibrium (µ, φ∗) where inference function φ∗ satisfies the D1 Criterion.
Informally, the set of signalling equilibria with inferences satisfying the D1 Criterion nests the set of
signalling equilibria with inferences satisfying the y-WD1. In looking, therefore, for signalling equilibria
with an inference function that satisfies y-WD1 we can restrict our attention to action functions µ∗
that result from signalling equilibria with an inference function that satisfies the D1 Criterion. We can
conclude, for example, from Table 1 that there does not exist a signalling equilibrium in Example 1
when xp = 1 if inferences satisfy uniform 2-WD1.
4 Equilibrium Existence
Our first result provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a signalling equilibrium
(µ∗, φ0) where inferences φ0 satisfy IWD1. The following result is due to Bernheim:
Fact 3 (Bernheim Theorems 2 and 5): Given Assumptions 1-3 there does exist a signalling equilibrium
(µ∗, φ∗) where inference function φ∗ satisfies the D1 Criterion.
Given Facts 2 and 3 our task is to look at each signalling equilibria (µ∗, φ∗) with an inference function
satisfying the D1 Criterion and question whether the existence of equilibrium (µ∗, φ∗) implies the ex-
istence of equilibrium (µ∗, φ0) where inference function φ0 satisfies IWD1. We begin with an example
demonstrating that a signalling equilibrium need not exist if inferences satisfy uniform IWD1.
In Example 2 we set λ = 2.5 and f(t) = 0.9 for t ∈ [0, 0.5] and t ∈ [1.5, 2] and f(t) = 0.1 for
t ∈ [0.5, 1.5]. The distribution of agent types is therefore skewed towards agents with ‘more extreme
types’. To illustrate that there does not exist a signalling equilibrium with inferences satisfying the
uniform IWD1 we consider norm xp = 1. When xp = 1 there is a unique signalling equilibrium (µ∗, φ∗)
supported by inferences satisfying the D1 Criterion. The pair (µ∗, φ0) is not, however, a signalling
equilibrium if inferences satisfy uniform IWD1.
To see why, we first note that (µ∗, φ∗) is a fully conformist equilibrium, so µ(t) = 1 for all t. Next,
consider the motivation for a type t = 0.5 agent to choose x = 0.5. One can easily calculate, as we do
14
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in the Appendix, that εφ
∗
(0.5, 0.5) = −0.633 < −0.6. In other words, a type t = 0.5 agent would prefer
x = 0.5 to x = 1 if the esteem from choosing 0.5 exceeded −0.6. We know, however, (by Lemma 1 and
the fact that tl = 0) that if inference function φy satisfies the uniform y-WD1, then T
φy = [0, ty] for
some ty. If ty ≥ 0.5, then we can also show that Hφy(x) ≥ −0.6. This gives the circularity that we
require: a type 0.5 agent would want to deviate to 0.5 if he gets esteem of more than −0.6 from doing
so, but if a type 0.5 agent is inferred as potentially deviating to 0.5, then the esteem from deviating
will be more than −0.6. Consequently, if inferences satisfy uniform IWD1, a type t = 0.5 agent would
prefer x = 0.5 to conformity and the pair (µ∗, φ0) cannot be a signalling equilibrium. The table below
illustrates this.
Table 2: Deriving inferences for Example 2.
y Tφy(0.5) Hφy(0.5)
−0.5334
0 [0, 0.75] −0.560
1 [0, 0.683] −0.567
...
...
...
∞ [0, 0.66] −0.569
The above treats the case of a norm xp = 1. To demonstrate formally that there does not exist a
signalling equilibrium where inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion for Example 2 we also need to consider
possible signalling equilibria with norms xp 6= 1. The conclusion, however, is the same, and because the
exercise is somewhat tedious we relegate the details to the Appendix.
The reason that there does not exist an equilibrium (µ∗, φ0) with inferences satisfying uniform IWD1
in Example 2 is that a type t = 0.5 agent would want to deviate to x = 0.5 even if inferences were such
that any agent who deviates to x = 0.5 is inferred to be of type 0.5 or less. This motivates our first
result and the following notation. Let
H(t1, t2) :=
1
F (t2)− F (t1)
Z t2
t1
f(b)h(b)db.
Note that if inferences φ0 are uniform and Tφ
0
(x) = [t1, t2], then Hφ
0
(x) = H(t1, t2). Define
E−(x) := H(tl, x) and E+(x) := H(x, th)
for all x ∈ (xl, xh) as the esteem from playing action x if an agent who chooses x is inferred to be equally
likely to have a type t ∈ [tl, x] or t ∈ [x, th] respectively. Figures 3a and 3b plot E−(x) and E+(x) for
Examples 1 and 2.
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Figure 3a: E-(x) and E+(x) in Example 1
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Figure 3a: E-(x) and E+(x) in Example 2
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Figure 3: Values of E−(x) and E+(x) for example 1 and 2.
We now define an important condition:
Worse-than Condition: We say that the worse than condition is satisfied if E−(x) < εφ
∗
(x, x) for all
x ∈ (xl, xp) and E+(x) < εφ
∗
(x, x) for all x ∈ (xp, xh).17
The worse than condition requires that an agent of type t < xp would not want to play action x = t
rather than norm xp if any agent who plays x is inferred to have a type between tl and x. Thus, a type t
agent would only want to play action x = t if in doing so he is inferred as potentially having a type b > t.
In Example 2 we saw that the worse than condition was not satisfied for x = 0.5. This is confirmed in
Figure 4b and was given as the reason an equilibrium did not exist. Figure 4a shows that the worse
than condition is satisfied in Example 1 where we have evidence to suggest that an equilibrium does
exist.
17 In the case of a fully separating equilibrium we think of the worse than condition as being satisfied ‘by default’ as
there exists no such x.
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Figure 4: The value of E−(x)− εφ
∗
(x, x) for x ∈ (xl, xp) and of E+(x)− εφ
∗
(x, x) for all x ∈ (xp, xh)
in Examples 1 and 2.
The following result demonstrates that the worse than condition is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for equilibrium existence.
Theorem 1: Let pair (µ∗, φ∗) be a signalling equilibrium where inference function φ∗ satisfies the D1
Criterion. If the worse than condition is satisfied and φ0 satisfies IWD1, then (µ∗, φ0) is a signalling
equilibrium. If the worse than condition is not satisfied, then there exists inference function φ0 that
satisfies IWD1 such that (µ∗, φ0) is not a signalling equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1: Pick a x ∈ (xl, xp) with a symmetric argument treating x ∈ (xp, xh). We begin
by showing that if the worse than condition is satisfied, no agent would wish to play x rather than xp. By
Lemma 1, Tφy(x) = [t−y , t
+
y ] for some t
−
y ≤ tl ≤ t+y . We conjecture (*) that limy→∞ t−y = limy→∞ t+y = tl.
If so, Tφ
0
(x) = {tl} = Tφ∗(x), and if playing x is not individually rational for an agent given inferences
φ∗, then it cannot be given inferences φ0.
To prove the conjecture (*) we begin by noting that, given Assumption 4 and Lemma 1, the maximal
esteem for choosing x that is consistent with inferences satisfying the Weak D1 Criterion would put
φ0(b, x) = kf(x) for some constant k and all b ∈ Tφ0 = [tl, t∗0] for some t∗0 ≤ t+0 . Thus, if inferences
φ0 satisfy the weak D1 Criterion we have H
φ0(x) ≤ E−(t∗0). The worse than condition implies that
E−(t∗0) < ε
φ∗(t∗0, t
∗
0). Given that g achieves a maximum at 0, we also know that ε
φ∗(t∗0, t
∗
0) ≤ εφ
∗
(x, t∗0).
Thus, Hφ0(x) < εφ
∗
(x, t∗0), implying that t
∗
0 /∈ T (x,Hφ0(x)) and t∗0 /∈ Tφ1(x) if inferences satisfy the 1-
WD1. Thus, we must have t+1 < t
∗
0. By the choice of t
∗
0 we also know that H
φ1(x) < E−(t∗0). Repeating
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the above argument we see that t+y strictly decreases to limit tl. That is limy→∞ t
+
y = tl. For t
+
y
suﬃciently close to tl we know by the worse than condition that t+y /∈ T (x,Hφy(x)), so Tφy+1(x) = {tl}
by Lemma 1. This implies that limy→∞ t−y = tl as desired.
To demonstrate the ‘only if’ element of the result, suppose that there exists some x < xp where
E−(x) ≥ εφ
∗
(x, x). We know that x ∈ T (x,Hφ∗(x)), so, we can set Tφ0 = [tl, x], implying that
Hφ0(x) = E−(x). Inferences φ0 satisfy the weak D1 Criterion. Given that E−(x) ≥ εφ
∗
(x, x), we know
that x ∈ T (x,Hφ0(x)), so we can set Tφ1 = [tl, x] and Hφ1(x) = E−(x). Iterating this argument implies
that there exists an inference function φy that satisfies y-WD1 and where x ∈ T (x,Hφy(x)) for all y.
There exist therefore inferences φ0 that satisfy IWD1 such that (µ∗, φ0) is not a signalling equilibrium.¥
Example 2 demonstrated that the worse than condition need not be satisfied and thus there need not
exist a signalling equilibrium with inferences satisfying IWD1. From Figure 4a we see that for Example
1 the worse than condition is satisfied, so there does exist a signalling equilibrium if inferences satisfy
IWD1. In looking for when the worse than condition will hold more generally, we make two observations.
First, the worse than condition will be satisfied if λ is suﬃciently large. To see why note that for λ
suﬃciently large there will only exist fully conformist equilibria.18 Using tl = 0 and th = 2 the worse
than condition can be rewritten
g(0)− g(xp − x) < λ
h
Hφ
∗
(xp)−H(0, x)
i
(10)
for all x ∈ (0, xp) and
g(0)− g(xp − x) < λ
h
Hφ
∗
(xp)−H(x, 2)
i
(11)
for all x ∈ (xp, 2). It can be shown (see Lemma 2 below) that there always exist some xp ∈ X such that
Hφ
∗
(xp) > H(0, x) for all x ∈ (0, xp) and Hφ
∗
(xp) > H(x, 2) for all x ∈ (xp, 2). Given that, in this case,
the right hand side of both (10) and (11) will be positive, the condition will hold for suﬃciently large
λ. In Example 2, for instance, the worse than condition is satisfied if λ > 5 (see the Appendix).
Second, we note that whether or not the worse than condition holds will depend on the distribution
of agent types. Recall that the worse than condition requires an agent of type t < xp not to want
to choose action x = t rather than norm xp if any agent who chooses x is inferred to have a type
between tl and x. This is more likely to hold if the esteem from conforming to the norm is relatively
high while the esteem of being inferred to have a type between tl and x is relatively low. The esteem
from conforming will be relatively high if proportionally many agents who conform have types near to
the ideal type. This suggests that the worse than condition is likely to hold when proportionally many
agents have types near to the ideal type. The following result supports this by demonstrating that the
worse than condition is satisfied in the spherical model if λ ≥ 1.5 and f is unimodal around 1 in the
sense that f is symmetric (f(t) = f(2 − t)) and f(t) ≤ f(t0) for all t < t0 ≤ 1. Note that f was not
unimodal in Example 2 where the ‘mass of agents’ with types at the two extremes lowered the esteem
from conforming and meant the worse than condition was not satisfied.
18A type t agent would conform to norm xp if g(0)+λmax{h(tl), h(th)} < g(t−xp)+λH(tl, th). Given that h(tl), h(th) <
H(tl, th), this is satisfied for suﬃciently high λ.
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Corollary 1: Suppose that g(z) = −z2, h(t) = −(1 − t)2, λ ≥ 1.5 and f is unimodal. Then, there
exists action function µ∗ such that (µ∗, φ0) is a signalling equilibrium for any inference function φ0 that
satisfies IWD1.
The proof is in the Appendix. One important point to note about Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 is that
they only guarantee existence of a signalling equilibrium with inferences satisfying IWD1. There may
not exist a signalling equilibrium with inferences satisfying the y-step IWD1 for some finite y, so, we
do require ‘introspection’ on the part of agents to be able to ‘sequentially eliminate deviating types’. In
reality, however, it may require only few iterations to eliminate types as we see in Table 1.
5 Equilibrium Selection
If inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion, then for suﬃciently high λ, there can exist a signalling equilibrium
(µ∗, φ∗) with any norm.19
Fact 4: For any x ∈ X there exists λx such that if λ > λx there exists a signalling equilibrium (µ∗, φ∗)
where inference function φ∗ satisfies the D1 Criterion and xp = x.
In this Section we shall demonstrate that if inferences satisfy IWD1, then equilibria need only exist for
specific norms. The ‘weaker inferences’ of IWD1 thus act as an equilibrium selection device. To explain
why we require a second lemma.
Lemma 2: (i) There exists a unique type tm ∈ [tl, th] such that E−(tm) = E+(tm). (ii) E−(x) is an
increasing function of x for all x ∈ (tl, tm] and E+(x) is a decreasing function of x for all x ∈ [tm, th).
(iii) E− (x) ≥ H(tl, th) for all x ∈ (tm, th) and E+(x) ≥ H(tl, th) for all x ∈ (tl, tm).
Proof : Given Assumptions 2 and 3 (in particular that f is continuous) it is immediate that E−(x) is a
continuous function of x and there exists real number x− such that E−(x) is increasing in x for x < x−
and decreasing in x for x > x−. Clearly E−(tl) = h(tl) and E−(th) = H(tl, th). Similarly E+(x) is a
continuous function of x that is increasing in x for x < x+ and decreasing in x for x > x+ for some real
number x+. Here E+(tl) = H(tl, th) and E+(th) = h(th). Finally, if E−(x) = E+(x), then because
H(tl, th) =
E−(x) [F (x)− F (tl)] +E+(x) [F (th)− F (x)]
F (th)− F (tl)
we know that E−(x) = H(tl, th). The three statements of the Lemma now follow.¥
Figures 3 (and 5 to follow) illustrate by plotting E−(x) and E+(x) for Examples 1, 2 (and 3). The
unique type tm where E−(tm) = E+(tm) will prove important in the following and be referred to as
the median type. The median type is characterized by a symmetry in which there is the same esteem
to being inferred as of a type ‘above tm’ as of a type ‘below tm’. The following result (a corollary of
19See Footnote 18 for an explanation why.
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Theorem 2 to come later) illustrates the potential for weaker inferences to select equilibria and also
illustrates the importance of the median type.
Corollary 2: If (µ∗, φ0) is a fully conformist equilibrium and inferences satisfy the uniform y-WD1 or
uniform IWD1, then xp = tm.
Below we shall consider the consequences of non-uniform inferences and partially separating equilibrium.
Before doing so, however, to illustrate Corollary 2, we look at what happens if f is not symmetric. If f
is symmetric and there is a fully conformist equilibrium with inferences satisfying uniform IWD1, then
the norm must be the action preferred by the ideal type. This seems intuitive given symmetry and
that 1 is the ideal type. If f is not symmetric, then tm is unlikely to equal 1, and there may exist no
signalling equilibrium supported by inferences satisfying IWD1 where the norm is 1. Example 3 will
hopefully show why this is also intuitive.
5.1 Selection with an asymmetric distribution
In Example 3 we set F (0) = 0.1 and F (t) = 0.1 + 0.45t for all t ∈ (0, 2].20 There is an obvious
asymmetry in the distribution where many agents have type t = 0. In the Appendix we show that
there exists a unique tm ' 1.17 where E−(tm) = E+(tm). Setting λ = 2.5 there does exist a fully
conformist equilibrium (µ∗, φ∗) supported by inferences satisfying the D1 Criterion if either xp = 1 or
xp = tm. Applying Corollary 2, however, there exists a fully conformist equilibrium (µ∗, φ0) supported
by inferences satisfying uniform IWD1 if and only if xp = tm.
We can illustrate the ‘if’ part of Corollary 2 by setting xp = tm and asking whether any agent would
want to deviate to x = 1. Intuitively a type t = 1 agent may want to deviate to signal that he does
have the ideal type. The following table shows, however, that if inferences satisfy the uniform 3-WD1,
then no agent would want to deviate.
Table 3: Deriving uniform inferences in Example 3 with xp = tm.
y Tφy(1) Hφy(1)
−0.4
0 [0, 1.085] −0.425
1 [0, 0.9] −0.495
2 [0, 0.309] −0.785
2 {0} −1
Deviating to x = 1 when the norm is x = tm is a signal that the agent has some type in the interval
[0, t+y ] for some t
+
y . In this example that is an ‘undesirable’ signal to send as it suggests the agent is
of type b = 0 with high probability. This is why no agent would wish to deviate to x < tm. Figure
5b confirms that there is indeed a signalling equilibrium if inferences satisfy IWD1 and xp = tm. To
20Clearly Assumption 2 is not satisfied. This, however, is not important for the example as we could ‘make f continuous’
without consequence for our analysis.
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illustrate the ‘only if’ part of Corollary 2, we set xp = 1 and show that some agent would want to
deviate to x = tm.
Table 4: Deriving uniform inferences in Example 3 with xp = 1.
y Tφy(tm) Hφy(tm)
−0.4
0 [1.085, 2] −0.364
1 [0.821, 2] −0.284
...
...
...
9 [0, 2] −0.4
The cycle of Table 4 repeats implying that some types of agent would always want to deviate to x = tm.
Deviating to x = tm when the norm is xp = 1 is a signal that the agent has some type in the interval
[t−y , 2] for some t
−
y . This is a ‘desirable’ signal to send, in this example, as it can be inferred the agent
cannot have type b = 0. This is illustrated in Figure 5c where we see that E+(x) > εφ
∗
(x, x) for x = tm,
so the worse than condition is not satisfied.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
Figure 5a: E-(x) and E+(x)
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Figure 5b: The worse than condition when xp = 1.17
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E(x) - epsilon(x,x)
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Figure 5c: The worse than condition when xp = 1
type
va
lu
e
E(x) - epsilon(x,x)
Figure 5: The values of E−(x) and E+(x) and of E−(x) − εφ
∗
(x, x) for x ∈ (xl, xp) and of E+(x) −
εφ
∗
(x, x) for all x ∈ (xp, xh) in Example 3.
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In Example 2 it is better to be inferred as having a type above 1 than below 1, so the norm cannot
exist on action xp = 1 if inferences satisfy uniform IWD1. It seems reasonable given the ‘mass of agents’
with type 0 that the norm should be above 1. More generally, the norm must exist on an action where
E−(x) and E+(x) coincide because only at this point will there be no incentives to deviate either above
or below xp. A weakening of inferences to IWD1 thus suggests that the action preferred by the median
type, and not that of the ideal type, may be an appropriate norm.
5.2 Equilibrium selection a partially conformist equilibrium
Section 5.1 and Corollary 2 focused on fully conformist equilibrium. We now briefly consider equilibrium
selection in the case of a partially conformist equilibrium. Uniform IWD1 does not act as such a powerful
equilibrium selection device in this case. To illustrate we can return to Example 1 but set xp = 1.05.
Now we find that tl = 0.177 and th = 2. Figure 6 plots the action function µ∗.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
type
ac
tio
n
Figure 6: The action function in Example 1 when xp = 1.05.
Given that E−(xp) 6= E+(xp) we may expect that a signalling equilibrium need not exist if inferences
satisfy uniform IWD1. There does, however, exist such an equilibrium. The following table illustrates
why by showing that no agent would have an incentive to deviate to x = 1.04 if inferences satisfy
uniform IWD1.
Table 5: Deriving uniform inferences in Example 1 with xp = 1.05.
y Tφy(1.04) Hφy(1.04)
−0.285
0 [0.154, 1.045] −0.226
1 [0.078, 2] −0.309
2 {tl} −0.677
The important point to recognize is that with a partially conformist equilibrium (µ∗, φ∗) where φ∗
satisfies the D1 Criterion, the esteem from deviating to x = 1.04 is h(0.177) = −0.677, not h(0) = −1
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(as would be the case with a fully conformist equilibrium). That inferences satisfy uniform IWD1 thus
provides contrasting eﬀects on the esteem to agents who deviate because they may be inferred as having
a type closer to 1 than tl but may also be inferred as having a type closer to 0 than tl. This implies that
uniform IWD1 is not so clearly ‘weaker’ than the D1 Criterion. That no agent would want to deviate
to x = 1.04 confirms this. Figure 7 further illustrates by contrasting the worse than condition with a
revised worse than condition. The revision uses H(0, x)− εφ∗(x, x) rather than the H(tl, xl)− εφ
∗
(x, x)
of the worse than condition to recognize that agents could potentially be inferred to have types less
than tl.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
type
ut
ili
ty
E(x) - epsilon(x,x)  
H(x,0) - epsilon(x,x)
Figure 7: The values of E−(x)−εφ
∗
(x, x) or H(0, x)−εφ∗(x, x) for x ∈ (xl, xp) and of E+(x)−εφ
∗
(x, x)
for x ∈ (xp, xh) in Example 1 when xp = 1.05.
The discussion above highlights that in the case of a partially conformist equilibrium, inferences sat-
isfying uniform IWD1 are not necessarily much weaker than the D1 Criterion. We do, however, still
obtain an equilibrium selection result if the requirement of uniform inferences is relaxed.
Theorem 2: If (µ∗, φ∗) is a signalling equilibrium where E−(xp) 6= E+(xp), then there exist inferences
φ0 satisfying IWD1 such that (µ∗, φ0) is not a signalling equilibrium.
Proof : Suppose that xp > tm with a symmetric argument treating xp < tm. Choose some x ∈
(xl, xp) such that x ≥ tm. Clearly, tm ∈ T (x,Hφ
∗
(xp)). Thus, by Lemma 1, inferences φ0 such that
Tφ0 = [tl, t
+
0 ] for some t
+
0 ∈ [tm, th) satisfy IWD1. By Lemma 2 we have that E−(t+0 ) ≥ H(tl, th).
Given that Hφ
∗
(xp) = H(tl, th) we have that tm ∈ T (x,Hφ0(x)). Repeating this argument we get
tm ∈ T (x,Hφy(x)). There exist therefore inferences satisfying y-WD1 such that a type tm agent would
wish to deviate to x rather than conform.¥
The proof of Corollary 2 is immediate by noting that the inferences given in the proof of Theorem
2 correspond to uniform inferences if tl = 0 (as would be the case with a fully conformist equilibrium).
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6 Non-uniform inferences
We have seen that if inferences satisfy uniform-IWD1, then there need not exist an equilibrium or can
exist at most one action that can be the norm. We also know (Facts 3 and 4) that if inferences satisfy
the D1 Criterion, then there exists a signalling equilibrium and any action could be the norm. Between
the extremes of uniform IWD1 and the D1 Criterion are criteria that satisfy IWD1 and result in more
or less signalling equilibrium and more or less actions that could be norms.
To illustrate we consider a simple ‘intermediate’ criterion of q uniform y-WD1. Recall that set
T (x,A) contains the types of agents who would wish to deviate to x if the esteem from choosing x is
A. We refine the uniform y-WD1 by selecting the proportion q who have the most incentive to deviate.
Formally, define
β(q, x,A) := min {β : F [T (x, β)] ≥ qF [T (x,A)]}
where F [T ] denotes the proportion of agents with types in set T .
q uniform y-WD1: Inference function φy satisfies q-uniform y-WD1 if
φy(b, x) =



0 for all b /∈ T (x, β(q, x,Hφy−1(x))
f(b)
hR
T (x,β(q,x,Hφy−1 (x)) f(b)db
i−1
otherwise
and φy−1 satisfies q uniform y − 1-WD1.
If q = 1, then inferences satisfy uniform y-WD1, and any agent with a positive incentive to deviate
is inferred as equally likely to have deviated. If q = 0, then inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion, and
only the type of agent with the most incentive to deviate is inferred as likely to deviate. Between these
extremes the proportion q who had the most incentive to deviate are inferred as likely to deviate. This
can have consequences for both equilibrium existence and equilibrium selection. We can illustrate by
revisiting Examples 2 and 3.
Recall that in Example 2 when q = 1 there did not exist a signalling equilibrium. Table 6 illustrates
that a type t = 0.5 agent would not have an incentive to deviate to x = 0.5 when q = 0.7 (even though
he does when q = 1). For example, if inferences satisfy the 0.7-uniform weak D1 Criterion then only
agents with types [0, 0.333] and not those with types [0, 0.75] are inferred as likely to deviate. This
lowers the esteem to choosing x from −0.56 to −0.704. The following can be compared to Table 2.
Table 6: Deriving q-uniform inferences in Example 2 with xp = 1 and q = 0.7.
y T (x,Hφy−1(0.5)) Tφy(0.5) Hφy(0.5)
−0.5334
0 [0, 0.75] [0, 0.333] −0.704
1 [0, 0.216] [0, 0.151] −0.856
2 {0} {0} −1
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Figure 8 confirms that when q = 0.7 there does exist a signalling equilibrium. The plot revises the
worse than condition to reflect q 6= 1 and plots, for instance, E−(qx)− εφ∗(x, x) for x ≤ 0.5.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
type
va
lu
e
E(x) - epsilon(x,x)
when q = 0.7       
Figure 8: The worse than condition in Example 2 when q = 1 and q = 0.7.
Moving on, in Example 3 we know that when q = 1 there is a unique signalling equilibrium with
norm xp = tm. If, however, q = 0.8 and inferences satisfy q-uniform IWD1, then there exists a signalling
equilibrium with xp = 1. Table 7 demonstrates why no agent would wish to deviate to x = tm when
xp = 1 and q = 0.8 and can be compared to Table 4.
Table 7: Deriving q-uniform inferences in Example 3 with xp = 1 and q = 0.8.
y T (x,Hφy−1(tm)) Tφy(tm) Hφy(tm)
−0.4
0 [1.085, 2] [1.268, 2] −0.447
1 [1.4277, 2] [1.542, 2] −0.612
2 {2} {2} −1
Figure 9 plots the revised worse than condition to demonstrates that when q = 0.8 there does exist a
signalling equilibrium.
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Figure 9: The worse than condition in Example 3 with xp = 1 when q = 1 and q = 0.7.
More generally, it is clear that if there exists a signalling equilibrium (µ∗, φ∗) with inferences sat-
isfying the D1 Criterion, then there exists a signalling equilibrium (µ∗, φ0) with inferences satisfying
q-uniform y-WD1 for all q ≤ q for some q > 0. The particular value of q will depend on the param-
eters of the model and nature of the signalling equilibrium. If, therefore, q < 1 and inferences satisfy
q-uniform y-WD1, then more actions can be norms. To summarize consider the thought experiment of
reducing q from 1 to 0. For q = 1 we may find that there exists no signalling equilibrium. For some q
there will exist a signalling equilibrium with norm x = tm. Reducing q further there will exist many
signalling equilibria where any action in some interval [xq−, x
q
+] can be a norm where t
m ∈ [xq−, x
q
+].
Decreasing q will increase the size of the interval until potentially any action x ∈ [0, 2] can be the norm
for q = 0.
7 Conclusions
Using a model of conformity introduced by Bernheim we have contrasted two systems of inferences.
If inferences satisfy the D1 Crit rion then any non-conformist is perceived to have the ‘most extreme
preferences’. If inferences satisfy a weaker IWD1 Criterion, then a non-conformist is perceived to be of
a type that could have potentially gained from deviating. We have provided necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of a signalling equilibrium that can be supported by any inferences satisfying
IWD1. One consequence of this was to demonstrate that a weakening of inferences acts as an equilibrium
selection device by reducing the set of signalling equilibria.
One implication of the equilibrium selection result we obtain is to reconsider the dynamics of con-
formity proposed by Bernheim who posits that a norm will remain relatively stable to changes in
preferences, but a large change in preferences can result in a discontinuous jump to some new norm.
This is possible because a particular action can be the norm for a wide range of type distributions
when considering signalling equilibria that are supported by inferences satisfying the D1 Criterion. Our
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results demonstrate that once weaker inferences are assumed, there may exist a unique signalling equi-
librium that changes as preferences change. This would suggest a more gradual evolution of the norm
as preferences change. Many norms, such as ‘how much to tip’ are, at least in principle, flexible to
changes in preferences, so this is not an unreasonable prediction.
An interesting question is what types of inferences, and what types of punishment mechanisms, do
exist to sustain conformity. This requires looking more closely at human behavior in specific economic
contexts. A particularly interesting issue is whether diﬀerent ‘belief structures’ tend to emerge in
diﬀerent contexts. For example, contrast two social norms. One norm may be to set artificially high
wages; the result is unemployment (Akerlof 1980). A second norm may be not to claim from the welfare
state; the result is reduced unemployment (Lindbeck et al. 1999). Clearly one of these norms could be
seen as good and the other bad. Is the equilibrium selection of ‘weak beliefs’ more likely to select ‘good
norms’? Also, are ‘weak beliefs’ more likely to exist around ‘bad norms’ as compared to ‘good norms’
on the basis that deviating from a bad norm is ‘more understandable’? We leave these as issues for
future work.
8 Appendix
8.1 Details of the Examples
In Example 1, As discussed by Bernheim, the solution for µs can be found by solving the linear
dynamic system · dt
dv
dx
dv
¸
=
·
x− t
λ(1− t)
¸
where v is a ‘dummy’ variable. Working through one obtains the diﬀerential equation x00+x0+λx = λ.
This has roots −12 ± 12(1 − 4λ)
1
2 . Setting λ = 1.25 and using initial conditions x(0) = t(0) = 0 gives
particular solution
x(v) = 1 + e−
1
2
v
µ
2λ− 1
2
sin v − cos v
¶
t(v) = 1 + e−
1
2
v
µ
1
2λ
µ
2λ− 1
2
− 2
¶
sin v − cos v
¶
.
Tracing out x and t as functions of v provides action x(v) as a function of type t(v) and thus gives µs.
Type tl and th are found by finding the type of agent who is indiﬀerent between choosing action µs(tl)
and being inferred as type tl versus choosing action 1 and receiving esteem Hφ(1). When xp = 1 the
symmetry of the problem implies that th = 2− tl, so, from (4),
Hφ(1) =
−1
2(1− tl)
Z 2−tl
tl
(1− b)2. (12)
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Given this we can find tl by setting
−(tl − µs(tl))2 − λ(1− tl)2 = −(1− tl)2 + λHφ(1). (13)
Using numerical methods to find an approximate value for tl we obtain tl = 0.0761. From (12) this im-
plies that Hφ
∗
(1) = −0.2845. We now have xp, tl, th and µs and thus have characterized the equilibrium.
We do, of course, need to check that this is indeed an equilibrium. Section 3 sets out the additional
requirements that need be imposed on inferences in order to satisfy the D1 Criterion (see, in particular,
Fact 1), but, given xp, tl, th and µs and the requirement that inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion, we
can derive the action function µ∗ and φ∗ using (2), (3) and Fact 1. It is then a simple matter to check
(5) and verify that there does indeed exist a signalling equilibrium with inferences satisfying the D1
Criterion that can be characterized as above. It should also be clear that this is the unique signalling
equilibrium with norm xp = 1.
In order to derive the numbers given in Table 1 of Section 3.2 we first need to calculate εφ
∗
(t, 0.9)
and εφ
∗
(t, 1.4) using (6). For example,
εφ
∗
(t, 0.9) =
−(t− µ∗(t))2 − λHφ∗(µ∗(t) + (0.9− t)2
λ
.
Figure 2 plots εφ
∗
(t, 0.9) and εφ
∗
(t, 1.4). Given a value for A one can then calculate T (0.9, A) and
T (1.4, A). If Tφ
y
(0.9) = [0, ty] for some ty and inferences are uniform then, using (9), we derive
Hφy(0.9) =
−1
ty
Z ty
0
(1− b)2 = −1 + ty −
t2y
3
. (14)
Similarly, if Tφ
y
(1.4) = [ty, 2] for some ty and inferences are uniform, then
Hφy(1.4) = 1− ty −
(2− ty)2
3
. (15)
Using this and the values of εφ
∗
(t, 0.9) and εφ
∗
(t, 1.4), the numbers in Table 1 are easily obtained.
In Section 5.2 we set xp = 1.05 in which case µs remains the same, but the values of tl and th will
change. Suppose that th = 2. Then
Hφ(xp) =
−1
2− tl
Z 2
tl
(1− b)2. (16)
Using relation (13) we then obtain tl = 0.1777 and Hφ(xp) = −0.2847. As when treating xp = 1 we can
now use Fact 1 to derive an action function and inference function and check (5) to verify that there does
indeed exist a signalling equilibrium with inferences satisfying the D1 Criterion characterized as above.
To derive the numbers in Table 5 we first calculate εφ
∗
(t, 1.04) using (6). The values of εφ
∗
(t, 1.04) are
plotted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: The value of εφ
∗
(t, 1.04) in Example 1 when xp = 1.05.
If Tφy = [td, ty] for some td, ty, then
Hφy(1.04) =
−1
ty − td
Z ty
td
(1− b)2.
Given this we can iteratively derive the figures in Table 5.
Throughout the remainder let H :=
R 2
0 f(b)h(b)db. In Ex mples 2, 3 and 4 where there exists a
fully conformist equilibrium, we know that tl = 0 and th = 2, so
Uφ
∗
(xp, t, φ∗) = −(xp − t)2 + λH.
Using equation (6) this implies that εφ
∗
(x, t) ≤ A if and only if
1
λ
h
Uφ
∗
(xp, t, φ
∗) + (x− t)2
i
≤ A
or
t(xp − x) ≤
1
2
£
λ(A−H) + x2p − x2
¤
. (17)
To check that there exists a signalling equilibrium supported by the D1 Criterion, we only need check
that a type 0 or type 2 agent has no incentive to choose x = 0 or 2 rather than not conform.21 In
equilibrium a type 0 agent receives payoﬀ Uφ
∗
(xp, 0, φ∗) = −x2p+λH, and a type 2 agent Uφ
∗
(xp, 2, φ∗) =
−(2−xp)2+λH. If a type 0 agent chooses x = 0 or a type 2 agent chooses x = 2 (and inferences satisfy
the D1 Criterion), he receives payoﬀ U(0, 0, φ∗) = U(2, 2, φ∗) = −λ. Thus, we need to check that
max
©
x2p, (2− xp)2
ª
≤ λ(1 +H). (18)
21Lemma 1 tells us that type 0 and 2 agents have the most incentive to deviate to any action x. A type 0 or 2 agent
has most incetive to deviate to x = 0 or x = 2 (if inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion).
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In Example 2
H =
Z 2
0
f(b)h(b)db = −2
·
0.9
Z 0.5
0
(1− b)2db+ 0.1
Z 1
0.5
(1− b)2db
¸
= −16
30
.
Putting xp = 1 and λ = 2.5 into condition (18) demonstrates there does exist a fully conformist
equilibrium (µ∗, φ∗) if inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion. To verify the figures given in the text we first
note that Uφ
∗
(0.5) = −(1− 0.5)2+ λHφ∗(1) = −1912 , so εφ
∗
(0.5, 0.5) = 1λU
φ∗(0.5) = −1930 < −
3
5 . Second,
if Tφy(0.5) = [0, ty] for some ty ≥ 0.5 then
Hφ
0
(0.5) ≥ −20
9
Z 0.5
0
9
10
(1− b)2db = − 7
12
.
To derive the numbers in Table 2 we first use (17) to derive that εφ
∗
(x, t) ≤ A if and only if
2t(1− x) ≤ λ
µ
A+
16
30
¶
+ 1− x2. (19)
If Tφ
y
(0.5) = [0, ty] for some ty ∈ (0.5, 1.5) and inferences are uniform, then, using (9),
Hφy(0.5) =
−1
0.45 + 0.1(ty − 2)
·
0.9
Z 0.5
0
(1− b)2 + 0.1
Z ty
0.5
(1− b)2
¸
=
−1
0.45 + 0.1(ty − 2)
"
56
240
+
1
10
Ã
ty − t2y +
t3y
3
!#
. (20)
Iterative use of (19) and (20) gives the numbers in Table 2. [To derive the numbers in Table 6 of Section
6 we iteratively use (19) and (14) to find Hφy(0.5) and T (x,Hφy−1(0.5)) = [0, t1y] with an intermediate
step to find Tφy(0.5) = [0, ty] where F (ty) = 0.7F (t1y).]
Thus far we have considered a signalling equilibrium with xp = 1. To verify there are no signalling
equilibrium in Example 2 with inferences satisfying uniform IWD1, we do need to consider other poten-
tial norms. We find that there does exist a signalling equilibria where inferences satisfy the D1 Criterion
for any norm xp ∈ (0.73, 1.27). For any signalling equilibria we can repeat the exercise above to show
that a type t = 0.5 (or t = 1.5) agent would wish to deviate from the norm. Figure 11 illustrates that
for xp > 1 a type t = 0.5 agent would wish to deviate to x = 0.5. Symmetry implies that a type t = 1.5
agent would wish to deviate for all xp < 1.
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Figure 11: The value of E−(0.5)− εφ
∗
(0.5, 0.5) against xp in Example 2.
Finally, To illustrate that the worse than condition is satisfied when λ > 5, we can derive εφ
∗
(x, x)−
E−(x) for all x ∈ (0, 0.5] to give
εφ
∗
(t, 0.5)−E−(x) >
−(1− t)2 + (0.5− t)2
5
− 16
30
+ 1− t+ t
2
3
=
19
60
− 4
5
t+
t2
3
≥ 0
as desired. When x ∈ (0.5, 1) the calculations are considerably more tedious because E−(x) is given by
(20), so we omit the details.
In Example 3 we see that H = − 110 −
9
10
1
3 = −0.4. Using condition (18) we can check that there
does exist a fully conformist equilibrium for xp = 1 and xp = 1.17 if λ = 2.5. To find tm we know from
Lemma 2 that E+(tm) = E−(tm) = H = −0.4. Using that
E+(2− t) = −
1
t
Z t
0
(1− b)2db = −1 + t− t
2
3
(21)
for all t < 2 and setting E+(2 − t) = −0.4 gives quadratic t2 − 3t + 1.8 = 0. Solving this and picking
the root t∗ less than 2 gives tm = 2− t∗ = 12 +
3
2
√
5
' 1.17. To derive the numbers in table 3 we first set
xp = tm and x = 1, and using (17) get that εφ
∗
(1, t) ≤ A if and only if
t ≤ 2.5A+ t
m2
2(tm − 1) . (22)
Next note that if Tφy = [0, ty] then
Hφy(ty) =
−0.1− 0.45
R ty
0 (1− b)
2db
0.1 + 0.45ty
=
−0.1− 0.45
³
ty − t2y +
t3y
3
´
0.1 + 0.45ty
. (23)
Iterative use of (22) and (23) yields Tφy(1) and Hφy(1) and the numbers in Table 3. To derive the
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numbers in Table 4 we set xp = 1 and x = tm to find εφ
∗
(1, t) ≤ A if and only if
t ≥ 2.5A+ 2− t
m2
2(1− tm) . (24)
If Tφy = [ty, 2] then, from (21), we can see
Hφy(t) = 1− ty −
(2− ty)2
3
. (25)
Iterative use of (24) and (25) yields Tφy(1) and Hφy(1) and the numbers in Table 4. To derive the
numbers in Table 7 of Section 6 we iteratively use (24) and (25) to find Hφy(tm) and T (x,Hφy−1(tm)) =
[t1y, 2] with an intermediate step to find T
φy(tm) = [ty, 2] where 1− F (ty) = 0.8
£
1− F (t1y)
¤
.
8.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Set xp = 1. Using H ≥ −1/3 we know by (18) that there exists a fully conformist equilibrium with
inferences satisfying the D1 Criterion. Now, fix an x < 1 (using a symmetric argument for x > 1).
Given Theorem 1 we need to show that,
g(0)− g(x− 1) < λ [H −E−(x)] . (26)
The value of g(0)− g(x− 1) = (1− x)2 is a given. The value of H −E−(x) will depend on f . We claim
(*) that H −E−(x) attains its minimum value when22
f(t) =
(
1
2(1−x) for all t ∈ [x, 1]
0 for all t ∈ [0, x).
Taking the claim as given, we have
H −E−(x) = −
1
1− x
Z 1
x
(1− b)2db+ (1− x)2
=
−1
1− x
·
1
3
− x+ x2 − x
3
3
¸
+ (1− x)2.
Substituting into (26) we require that
(1− x)2 < −λ
1− x
·
1
3
− x+ x2 − x
3
3
¸
+ λ(1− x)2,
which simplifies to
2
3
λ− 1− x(1− x)(2λ− 3)− x3
µ
2
3
λ− 1
¶
> 0. (27)
22The support [f ] does not equal T , but this is basically irrelevant. Making the support equal to T will only increase
H −E−(x).
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Given that maxx(1− x) = 14 , equation (27) holds if λ >
3
2 .
It remains to prove the claim (*). The intuition is simpler than the formal argument. Essentially we
wish to minimize H and maximize E−(x) within the limits that f be unimodal around 1. Given that
h(t) is increasing in t for t < 1, the value of H will be minimized by setting f(t) = y for some y and all
t ∈ [x, 1]. The value of E−(x) is maximized, relative to this, (and the restriction that f be unimodal)
by setting f(t) = y for all t ∈ [q, x) and some q. Given that F (1) = 0.5 we know that (1− q)y = 0.5, so
set
fq(t) =
(
1
2(1−q) for t ∈ [q, 1]
0 for t ∈ [0, q)
.
We now need to show that H − E−(x) is minimized when q = x. This follows due to the concavity of
the h function. Given that h(x) > h(t) + (x− t)h(1) for all t < x, putting more weight on types t > x
reduces H −E−(x). We can, however, provide a more formal argument. First, note that
H −E−(x) =
1
1− q
Z 1
q
h(b)db− 1
x− q
Z x
q
h(b)db
=
1
1− q
Z 1
x
h(b)db− 1− x
(x− q) (1− q)
Z x
q
h(b)db
=
−1
3(1− q) +
1
x− q
µ
x− x2 + x
3
3
¶
− 1− x
(x− q) (1− q)
µ
q − q2 + q
3
3
¶
(28)
=
1
1− q
·
x− x2 + x
3
3
+
1− x
1− q
µ
1− (q + x) + (q + x)
2
3
¶
− 1
3
¸
. (29)
Next, note that x−x2+ x33 ≥ q−q2+
q3
3 ≥ 0 and 1 ≥ x ≥ q ≥ 0. By inspection, to minimize H−E−(x),
we need that q = x.¥
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